The right to doubt: Climate-change scepticism and asserted rights to private property by Lo, Alex Y.
Title The right to doubt: Climate-change scepticism and assertedrights to private property
Author(s) Lo, Alex Y.
Citation Environmental Politics, 2014, v. 23, n. 4, p. 549-569
Issued Date 2014
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/210133
Rights
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.; This is
an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor &
Francis Group in [Environmental Politics] on [2014], available
online at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09644016.2014.8843
10; This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
The Right to Doubt:  
Climate Change Scepticism and Asserted Rights to Private Property 
Alex Y. Lo 
Griffith School of Environment, Griffith University, Gold Coast, Queensland, 
Australia 
Email address: alex.lo@griffith.edu.au 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Many recent planning decisions, such as planned retreat of coastal settlements from 
the sea, are premised upon the scientific consensus that climate change is real. Not 
all local residents accept forced relocation and some hold a radical form of rights-
based belief that is hostile to government intervention into private arenas. This 
‘deontological libertarian’ belief is related to a sceptical view of climate science. Data 
from an Australian survey is employed to demonstrate that climate scepticism is 
associated with the tendency to see private property rights as a fundamental 
entitlement irredeemable in the prospect of forced retreat, regardless of 
compensation. The sceptical view has defensible normative elements constructed 
upon the framework of inviolable rights also underpinning recognised environmental 
and development imperatives.  Appealing to absolute rights generally may be an 
effective way to approach the sceptical public; rights offer a generalisable 
framework in which they can see how their non-sceptical counterparts are similarly 
situated despite expressing a different policy preference. Although consensus is not 
guaranteed, communication can proceed more easily by making a common 
ontological terrain explicit. 
 
Keywords: climate adaptation, planned retreat, property rights, climate scepticism, 
climate change ethics. 
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 Introduction 
Constitutions restrict the taking of private property for public purposes without the 
payment of compensation. Environmental legislation, however, may provide 
government the authority to enter the private sphere and regulate private property 
where overriding public interest is at stake. One example that has come to the 
forefront of climate adaptation debates is planned (or managed) retreat policies, 
which require coastal residents to move away from the sea when sea levels rise 
above a certain level (Cooper and McKenna 2008, Abel et al. 2011).  
Most of the consequences of climate change are far-reaching and causality is 
hard to establish, and it is politically challenging to define whose interests count. The 
long timeframes and systemic uncertainties leave considerable room for reasonable 
doubts. As an adaptive response to climate change, planned retreat is therefore a 
highly contentious policy option (Hayward 2008). Affected property owners who find 
their property rights under threat are motivated to challenge the allegedly 
ambiguous rationale for compulsory relocation. These include informed individuals 
questioning the science of climate change (Alexander et al. 2012, Ryan et al. 2012). 
 Dismissing climate scepticism by asserting the authority of science has 
proven to be futile (Moser and Dilling 2011, Norgaard 2011). Inculcating fear of the 
impacts of climate change might even be counterproductive. Moser and Dilling (2011) 
suggest that climate change communicators should deploy carefully crafted 
messages that are culturally specific to, and whose sources are trusted by, their 
audience in order to engage them in constructive conversations. Dryzek (2010) goes 
further by arguing for the use of ‘bridging rhetoric’ to facilitate communication on 
climate change. This entails identifying and addressing the link between differing 
ideological preoccupations and cultural manifestations of climate change.   
 Climate change believers seem to have little to share with other members of 
the public who are sceptical toward climate change. Cooperation between these 
diverging groups, however, is necessary for broad-based concerted actions. Common 
grounds for workable agreements do exist (Malone 2009, Dryzek and Lo 
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forthcoming). Agyemen et al. (2007) argue that the key to motivating the 
unconcerned public is to shift climate change from a scientific-technical issue to one 
of human rights and justice.  I take this argument forward by suggesting that such a 
shift in framing is critical to approach and engage with the sceptical public. Climate 
scepticism cannot be reduced to an assessment of science (Hulme 2009), and can be 
more easily reached through various storylines featuring some sort of justice 
arguments. Arguments couched in terms of inviolable rights, for example, could 
provide an opportunity for (some) climate believers and sceptics to see each other’s 
position in a more positive light, from which constructive conversations could 
proceed, even though they continue to disagree on whose rights merit priority. This 
requires demonstrating the systematic relationship between climate scepticism and 
defensible rights-based concerns. Such an approach varies from the common 
practice that seeks to de-legitimise opposing views.   
I present arguments for this approach and some evidence collected from a 
social survey conducted in Australia. Findings show that sceptical climate change 
beliefs are associated with a radical conception of private property rights. This lends 
empirical support to proposals for creative treatments that reduce climate 
scepticism to a judgement of moral merits. To start with, in the next section I outline 
a cultural view of climate change. This is followed by a discussion about how those 
competing beliefs can be assembled under a rights framework1 to help uncover 
common moral grounds. Research methods, by which supporting data were 
collected and analysed, are then introduced.  I conclude by identifying some 
implications of this research for climate change communication and governance.    
 
A cultural conception of climate scepticism 
While most environmental campaigns have a well-articulated moral basis, the case 
for climate scepticism is more contested. The latter is often understood as a social ill 
1 In my discussion, ‘rights’ are related to both interests and morality. There are differences between 
the two forms, but they can be articulated in similar terms, as is argued later.   
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(Hamilton 2010, Washington and Cook 2011). Washington and Cook (2011, p. 154), 
for instance, describe it as ‘a delusion that has become a pathology’. Their 
arguments miss the richness in the ways in which people engage in the physical 
world (climate) within constructed space (society). Risk perception has cultural and 
moral bases (Thompson and Rayner 1998). Individuals and societies attach a variety 
of cultural and ideological meanings to the climate (Hulme 2009). These meanings 
vary across time and place; they connote what we think the ‘good life’ should be, for 
which science can hardly tell right or wrong.  
 Mike Hulme (2009) offers a comprehensive cultural account of climate 
scepticism, persuading us to lend a sympathetic ear to those not attending to the 
recognised science of climate change. Hulme’s analysis highlights the role of cultural 
trajectories and entrenched social norms, and is rooted in the cultural theory of risk, 
which suggests that individuals select aspects of information about risk to which they 
pay attention and respond, in accordance with their pre-existing cultural bias 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, Wildavsky 1987). Individuals tend to ignore 
information or underestimate probabilities when the social networks or cultures in 
which they engage do not support or have their own ways to process such 
information (Renn 2011). Climate scepticism is found to be associated with a specific 
set of fundamental values and political ideologies (Poortinga et al. 2011, Whitmarsh 
2011). These values and ideologies select a proprietary socio-cognitive strategy for 
interpreting messages about risks. For example, some individuals conflate climate 
change with stratospheric ozone depletion because they are concerned about 
human insult to the atmosphere, rather than the atmosphere per se. As Thompson 
and Rayner (1998, p. 152) explain, ‘the climate change issue is perceived as part of a 
wider problem concerning humankind’s disturbed relationship with nature. In this 
sense, climate change and ozone depletion are the same thing’. Thus, individuals 
merely respond to an abstract symbol – human damage to the environment. Climate 
change happens to be one of many items subsumed under that symbol. 
In practice, many cultural and ideological symbols exist. Each of them 
recognises a particular way in which we understand our relationship with the natural 
and social worlds. Another example is ‘progress’, or views of development. As Hulme 
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(2009, p. 251) argues, ‘one of the reasons we disagree about climate change is 
because we understand development differently’. Anthropogenic climate change is 
an unintended consequence of continuing economic growth, which has benefited 
the present generations. Attempts to perpetuate economic prosperity, however, are 
called into question by the soaring GHG emissions levels. Our present lifestyle 
heavily depends on fossil fuel burning. Mitigating GHG emissions is then regarded as 
a challenge to our aspirations to maintain the cherished lifestyle or pursue a better 
one. We enjoy our way of living, but the knowledge that this comes into conflict with 
morality and that a change of lifestyle would be painful leads us to shut our ears to 
mitigate the disconcerting and embarrassing feeling (Norgaard, 2011). The more we 
are locked-in to the fossil fuel economy or construe material growth as glorious, the 
more likely we are to deny the existence of anthropogenic climate change. Desire for 
progress discourages us from acknowledging the moral threat to it.  
Dealing with climate change can be reconstructed as a cultural project. 
Hulme (2009) shows that climate is a carrier of an array of imaginations as to how 
social order should be established. He summarises these envisions as four ‘myths’ of 
climate change, which connote ‘our lament for the past, our fear of the future, our 
desire for control, and our instinct for justice’ (Hulme, 2009, p. 364). Disagreements 
between climate change beliefs are then construed as cultural and ideological 
conflicts between these contested envisions. Hulme (2009) suggests that we should 
recognise the co-existence of the multiple stories of climate change and approach 
them in creative and culturally sensitive ways in order to shed light on the ways 
forward. This endeavour begins with understanding people’s responses to climate 
change as a projection of an idealised social order. 
What aspects of the social order characterising climate scepticism should we 
address to give impetus to collective action? Dryzek and Lo (forthcoming) suggest 
that the key is to invoke shared terms of reference that allow different possibilities 
for interpretation. That is, aspects of a social order that are recognised by diverging 
groups but are systematically linked to their competing views about climate change.  
On the issue of planned retreat, the deep-seated differences in risk perception 
reflect variations in broader worldview (Alexander et al., 2011). However, Malone 
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(2009) has shown that unexpected sites of agreement exist and lie in the moral 
framework by which action is evaluated.  Sceptics may embrace a worldview that 
contains elements morally defensible in terms others could recognise. This idea is 
further explained in the following section with specific reference to planned retreat 
policies.  
 
Linking conceptions of rights 
What are the moral elements underpinning climate change belief? Some scholars 
have raised questions about the scientific merits of rights-based approaches of 
climate ethics. In a review of neuroscience literature, Grasso (2013, p.389) concludes 
that climate ethics should be based on consequential rather than deontological 
approaches 2  because the latter ‘do not resonate with human morality, and 
ultimately cannot capture the inner moral nature of climate change’. The argument 
is that climate-related harm originates from impersonal moral violations and is likely 
to prompt consequentialist reasoning. However, the consequentialist approaches 
are more useful for understanding the average citizen than the radical minority 
engaging in non-organised climate activism and scepticism. Moreover, in practice, 
the distinction between ‘personal’ and ‘impersonal’ is not always clear. Highly 
vulnerable groups, such as the Inuit and Pacific small island communities, see climate 
change as a local and immediate threat to livelihood and even survival (Adger, 2004; 
Adger et al., 2011). Planned retreat in the context of climate change is an example. 
Anticipated consequences of climate change include loss of housing in coastal 
settlements due to rising sea levels. Planned retreat from the sea is a suggested 
adaptation option, but affected communities have expressed concerns about 
government’s handling of property rights and compensation (Abel et al., 2011; 
Hayward, 2008). Ryan et al. (2012) find that members of a community hesitate to 
2 According to Grasso (2013, p. 381-382), ‘deontology judges the morality of states of affairs on the 
basis of their conformity with a moral norm’……whereas the consequentialist approach ‘holds that 
acts and/or intentions are morally relevant, i.e. right, wrong or indifferent, only in virtue of their 
consequences’. 
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invest in a house purchased with a forced retreat cause under conditions of sea level 
rise. It is worth noting that those who doubt that the sea levels are rising are 
particularly hostile to the retreat policy. These individuals, being sceptical toward 
climate change generally, tend to question that a fair and just scheme for 
governments to acquire property rights is ever possible (Ryan et al., 2012). 
The tendency to believe that climate change legislation constitutes a violation 
of private property rights captures the essence of libertarianism. Libertarians put the 
rights of private property owners at a premium and see the invasion of persons and 
property as unethical (Nozick 1974). According to this view, individuals should be 
free from the coercive power of government and that regulatory constraints on the 
use of privately owned land should be minimised. An absolutist version of this moral 
doctrine is known as ‘deontological libertarianism’, which holds that natural rights 
should be honoured as a fundamental morality and protected from violation under 
any circumstances.  
Goodin (1992) contends that there is no necessary trade-off between 
property rights and preservation of the natural environment. Libertarianism is not 
completely at odds with environmental narratives (Sagoff 1992). Other forms of 
deontological doctrines have been extended to conceptions of public goods, such as 
the environment (Paavola 2007, O'Neil et al. 2008). ‘Deontological 
environmentalism’, as described by Spash (1997, p. 405), refers to the view that 
aspects of the environment have an absolute right to be protected, regardless of 
possible consequences.  
Historically, the rights of individual sovereignty, later extended to the non-
human world, received recognition in a larger societal process which witnessed the 
juridical construction of private property rights. David Harvey (2003) laments that 
manifestations of private property rights have perpetuated capital accumulation, 
which is deemed to be a source of social injustice and environmental damage. But 
ironically,  some universal rights, such as the right to be treated with dignity and 
freedom of speech, are in practice derivatives of private property rights applying to 
one’s own body - ‘derivative rights’ in Harvey’s own words (Harvey 2003, p. 940). 
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This suggests a common ontological ground on which the rights of individuals or 
non-human species to be protected from environmental damage or habitat loss can 
be articulated in terms that property rights advocates could respect.  
For example, libertarians such as Shaw and Stroup (1992, cited in Sagoff, 
1992, p. 226) agree that pollution ‘is an invasion of person and property just as 
personal assault is’. Philosopher Mark Sagoff (1992, p. 227) therefore suggests that 
‘environmentalists could follow the lead of libertarians’ by insisting that pollution 
should be treated as a tort. The libertarian view has also produced strong doctrines 
of animal rights when extended onto the terrain of rights accorded to all subjects of 
a life (Harvey 1996). Some aspects of environmental movement can be seen as 
ontologically congenial to libertarianism in terms of assigned primacy of rights. As 
pointed out by Sagoff (1992, p. 229), libertarians believe that the best way to 
preserve the environment is to protect property rights, whereas environmentalists 
might argue that the best way to protect rights is to preserve the environment. Both 
of them attend to concerns for absolute rights and agree on the range of policy 
choices, although they differ as to whose rights merit more attention.  
Contemporary climate change debates feature such differing but mutually 
intelligible assertions of rights. Liberty and property are the most common objects to 
which conceptions of inviolable rights apply (Peterson and Liu 2008). These two 
attributes, broadly defined, have attracted attention from both sides of the debates. 
Climate change has been seen as wrongdoing because it may contravene our 
constructed framework of human rights (Hulme 2009, Brandstedt and Bergman 
2013). It may lead to premature death of individuals; accelerating sea level rises, for 
instance, may cause inundation of small island states and their civilizations to vanish 
(Adger et al. 2011). As Adger (2004, p. 1714) argues, ‘we should all have a right to 
keep cold’. Human contributions to climate change can be seen as constituting a 
violation of basic rights of life, liberty, security, mobility and progeny declared 
universal by the United Nations in 1948 (Hulme, 2009). Climate change can be 
understood as a human rights issue. 
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Rights have also been used as a moral shield against unwelcome international 
climate change regulations. Major developing countries assert the right to 
development and improvement in the well-being of their citizens deprived of basic 
subsistence. This has been taken as a moral reason for continuing to produce 
‘survival emissions’ (Agarwal and Narain 1991). The argument is entangled with an 
assertion of freedom from outside interference by the industrialised world, which 
demands further cuts in emissions while being historically responsible for creating 
the problem of climate change as well as the structural inequities between the global 
North and South (Ikeme 2003, Lo 2010). It is noteworthy that ‘the right to 
development’ is also recognised by the United Nations: ‘the right of peoples and 
nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be 
exercised in the interest of their national development…’ (Eckersley 2004, p. 221-
222). In proposing a concept known as ‘greenhouse development rights’, Baer et al. 
(2009) define the right to development as an individual human right to a modest 
level of wellbeing. Ontologically this is not a remarkable departure from the sort of 
rights advocated by climate activists. Assertion of inviolable rights can reach both 
sides of the debates. 
Such ‘generalisable’ moral ideals can facilitate communication in polarised 
debates on climate change (Lo et al. 2013). Effective communication is considered to 
be of critical importance to motivate joint efforts at dealing with climate change 
(Moser and Dilling, 2011). The key is how to generalise decisive elements of a 
discourse to its alternatives so that the otherwise blurred connections become 
discernible, without displacing each other’s deep-seated values. Assertion of 
absolute rights is one example that could be couched in terms that both parties 
could comprehend and recognise, subject to nuanced interpretations, as suggested 
by Sagoff (1992, p. 229) above. Properly articulated, it can help environmentalists 
and sceptics see each other positively in their constructed worlds.  
A critical task ahead is to characterise the ways in which rights-based 
arguments are embedded into societal responses to climate change, from which 
common grounds can be identified. A large body of research has ascertained their 
role in environmentalism (Spash 2006, O'Neil et al. 2008), and climate justice (Baer 
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et al. 2009, Bell 2011). Yet there is a shortage of systematic evidence on the extent 
to which aspects of scepticism operate on a congenial ontological terrain. In other 
words, do climate sceptics hold any rights-based belief pertaining to climate change?   
Initial evidence provided by Ryan et al. (2012) suggests that the issue of 
property rights warrants further exploration. In the light of their findings, the 
present research seeks to ascertain the relationship between climate scepticism and 
a moral equivalent of the ‘right to development’ that is relevant to individual context, 
i.e. individual rights to private property. The latter is couched in terms of 
deontological libertarianism to resonate with the concept of ‘deontological 
environmentalism’. These competing theories share a deontological premise, and 
can potentially act as a rhetorical ‘bridge’ to facilitate communication (Dryzek 2010). 
Demonstrating the shared commitment to absolute rights is the first step towards 
finding ways to help environmentalists and climate change campaigners understand 
and persuade their sceptical counterparts. The next section describes the design of 
an empirical study that explored the rights elements of climate scepticism.   
 
Research method 
Sampling sites 
This study is based on a telephone survey conducted in Queensland, Australia. 
Historically, Queensland has had a variable climate. Regional projections show the 
State facing growing risks from extreme weather events, thanks to anthropogenic 
climate change (Queensland Government, 2011).  Acceleration of sea level rises is 
one of the adverse consequences of climate change as rising global temperature 
increases the rate of ice loss from the Greenland and Antarctic icesheets and thermal 
expansion of ocean water. The resulting rises in sea levels are likely to increase the 
extent of coastal flood events and shoreline erosion in coastal settlements. South-
east Queensland is a hotspot for weather extremes exacerbated by climate change 
(Department of Climate Change 2009), with the current 1 in 100 year storm event 
expected to occur more frequently - every 14 years with a sea level rise of 0.8m 
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(Queensland Government, 2011, p. 13). Consequently coastal settlements are 
exposed to higher risks of inundation and property damage. 
 Planned retreat has been proposed as a risk mitigation option (Abel et al., 
2011). It is considered to be less expensive, over the long term, than protective and 
accommodative strategies, such as building seawalls and elevating buildings, and so 
may be the most appropriate policy response for low-lying coastal communities that 
cannot afford to invest in long-term strategies to mitigate the risks of accelerated 
sea level rise. However, because planned retreat involves active government 
intervention and enormous costs, it has not received widespread support from local 
communities.  
In the event of forced retreat from the sea, claims for compensation and 
relocation expenses are likely to put local councils under huge financial pressure. The 
enormous costs involved would be borne by the wider community and inevitably 
raise fairness concerns for non-coastal residents who, in effect, would have to pay 
for the investment decisions of individual property owners (Cooper and McKenna, 
2008). Legal consideration of planned retreat may increase market uncertainty and 
reduce land values for pre-existing communities. This has led to strong opposition 
from existing private property owners (Alexander et al., 2011; Hayward, 2008). Thus, 
the conditions upon which private property rights are redeemed are subject to 
intense disputes (Alexander et al., 2011; Ryan et al., 2012). The controversies are in 
part politically driven, because the retreat policy is premised upon evidence on 
climate change, which is itself a highly contentious concept within the Australian 
community (Hobson and Niemeyer 2011, Climate Institute 2012).    
 The survey was developed against this backdrop. Data were collected from 
south-east Queensland, including the Gold Coast Council Region, the Sunshine Coast 
Council Region, and the Greater Brisbane Region (i.e. Brisbane, Ipswich, Logan, 
Redland and Moreton Bay Council areas). According to the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2011 Census data, these regions together account for 64.3% of the total 
population of Queensland, or 13.0% of national population. Despite facing growing 
risks of extreme weather, these regions recorded the largest population increases 
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state-wide between 2003 and 2008 (Department of Climate Change, 2009). This 
raises their vulnerability to catastrophic flooding and cyclone events. The increasing 
likelihood of recurring natural disasters and their causal relationship with 
anthropogenic climate change have been taken into account in the design of the 
interview protocol, which is described in the next section. 
 
Measures 
The survey was based on a structured questionnaire designed to statistically 
examine the relationship between people’s beliefs about climate change and 
property rights. A number of close-ended questions were included in the 
questionnaire, as described below.   
In the survey the issue of property rights was introduced in the context of 
accelerated sea level rises. The following introductory text was read out to 
respondents to provide background information and explain the idea of planned 
retreat as a possible response option: 
Scientists suggest that the sea level has been rising due to climate change. It 
is predicted that the sea level around Queensland may rise by about 0.8 
metres by 2100 as a result of climate change. If this happens more 
settlements in Southeast Queensland will be subject to inundation on a more 
frequent basis. An option that is being considered is managed movement 
away from coastal settlements that are under threat. Residents would be 
evacuated and property rights may be renounced to leave spaces for building 
natural or artificial defences. In the context of sea level rise, which of the 
following statements about private property rights most closely matches 
your views? 
In the above text the projection of sea level rise by 0.8 metres is a planning reference 
adopted by the State (Queensland Government, 2011, p. 13). Also, planned retreat is 
highly relevant to south-east Queensland and its feasibility has been considered for 
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the State (Abel et al., 2011), where the survey was administrated. Thus the content 
of the introductory text is authentic.  
The handling of property rights proves to be a key concern for local residents. 
Previous research has suggested that prospects for compensation are central to local 
debates, and there are divisive opinions creating political obstacles to implementing 
a retreat policy (Hayward, 2008; Ryan et al., 2012). Immediately after listening to the 
introductory text, respondents were asked to define the nature of private property 
rights in this context. They responded to the following three statements and 
indicated the most agreed one (a null option ‘None of these’ was available but not 
read out):  
1. Property rights are a fundamental right and cannot be renounced regardless 
of compensation  
2. Property rights can be renounced if adequately compensated by government  
3. Property rights can be renounced without compensation if owners have been 
informed of the risk before purchase  
Statement 1 is characterised by the claimed indifference to personal economic 
consequences and represents a deontological commitment against any forced 
liquidation of privately owned properties. Ontologically it resembles the strong 
rights-based belief item tested by Spash (2006) for other environmental issues. The 
second statement involves a qualified concept of rights, which can be redeemed if 
compensation for affected property owners exceeds a certain level. This connotes a 
consequential belief as opposed to the deontological one. The third one denies 
rights to private property if owners elect to bear the risk involved.   
Climate change belief was gauged on both nominal and ordinal scales.  
Respondents were prompted if they believed that climate change is real or not. 
Positive response to this question brought them to three additional options 
(exclusive choice): whether it is out of control; new technology can fix it; and it is a 
failure of political leadership. These items were formulated on the basis of Hobson 
and Niemeyer’s (2011) interview-based analysis of climate change discourses in 
Australia. The survey statements correspond to the distinctive features of the four 
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discourses identified by Hobson and Niemeyer (2011, p. 962). They were included to 
capture the most salient qualitative differences in climate change belief. 
The ordinal scale offered quantitative strength for the measurement of 
climate change belief. Respondents were prompted to indicate the levels of 
agreement on five statements, which broadly fall into two categories. The first 
category, ‘Fear and Trust’, included three separate questions assessing the extent in 
which the problem of climate change is believed to be overstated and the authorities 
making such an (over)statement are trusted. In formulating these items, recent 
studies, such as Hobson and Niemeyer (2011), Poortinga et al. (2011) and Whitmarsh 
(2011), were consulted to ensure relevance and coherence. The second category, 
‘Adverse Impacts’, contained two statements about human contributions to climate 
change and a possible consequence, i.e. more frequent and severe natural disasters. 
Validity of these two statements is backed by an official climate change report 
released by Queensland Government (Queensland Government, 2011). 
Socio-economic information of the respondents was collected both at the 
beginning and the end of the interview. These included household size, gender, age, 
education, and household income. Reported household size was used for initial 
screening of respondents. Sampling procedures are introduced and explained in the 
following section. 
 
Sampling method 
The main survey was administered by an established market research company in 
May 2012. Sample was selected using a random digit dialing approach for 
households with landlines, stratified by telephone exchange prefix. It was 
supplemented with 10%-15% of residential mobile phone numbers selected from the 
electronic white pages so that mobile numbers could be stratified by region (as these 
numbers have a residential address attached to them).  
Quotas were used in the selection of households for interview. In order to 
obtain a representative sample of households, sample quotas were set by the 
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number of people living in each household per region, based on the latest available 
census data (2006) at the time of research.  The number of people in household was 
obtained from each contacted household who agreed to participate, and used for 
initial screening in accordance with the set quotas. 
 
Results 
 
Sample characteristics 
A total of 501 individuals completed the questionnaire. Table 1 shows the socio-
economic characteristics of the respondents, including household income, gender, 
age, education, and household size. About 31.1% of respondents had an annual 
household income below AUD50,000, 47.3% earned AUD50,000 – 150,000 a year, 
and 12.2% had more than AUD150,0003. Fewer than half (44%) of respondents were 
male. More than 70% were aged above 45. Nearly 41% held a university degree or 
higher degree. Fewer households with only one person (18%) completed the survey 
than actually resided in the regions (22.2%, based on 2011 census data). About 37.9% 
of the households interviewed across the three regions consisted of two members 
only, higher than the regional estimate of 35.1%. Three-member households 
accounted for 17.4% of the sample, comparable to the census figure of 16.7%. 
Families with four members or more were over-represented in the survey by a small 
margin, i.e. 26.8% comparing to the regional estimate of 25.9%. Thus the sampling 
method produced a generally representative sample in terms of household 
composition. 
 
Asserted property rights 
3 AUD/USD = 0.993, as of 16 May 2012. Source: U.S. Federal Reserve. 
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As shown in Table 2, the majority of respondents agreed that property rights can be 
renounced in the context of sea level rise. Half (49.9%) indicated the need for 
adequate compensation to affected homeowners. Others – 32.1% of the sample – 
agreed but qualified this claim by suggesting that compensation should depend on 
prior knowledge of risk. About 13% of respondents held a deontological 
position,agreeing that property rights are irredeemable, regardless of pecuniary 
compensation, in the prospect of planned retreat triggered by accelerated sea level 
rises. These people held a strong rights-based belief that can be couched in terms of 
deontological libertarianism in the present context.  
 
Climate change beliefs 
Total numbers of response for each category of climate change beliefs measured on 
the nominal scale are listed in Table 3. The most radical form of climate scepticism 
rejects the claim that climate change is real at all. A minority of respondents (13.4%) 
identified themselves as a radical sceptic, or trend sceptic (Poortinga et al., 2011). 
More than 70% believed that climate change is real, a belief that is multifaceted and 
can be analytically further split into three items in terms of the perceived nature of 
the problem (Hobson and Niemeyer, 2011). Some individuals were convinced that 
the problem is out of control, suggesting a sense of powerlessness; 35.5% of 
respondents described themselves thus, a position labelled as defeatism in Table 3. 
Others (20.6%) expressed optimism towards technologies as a solution to the 
problem of climate change. A comparable number (19.4%) was recorded for a 
politically oriented view of climate change, which is deemed to be driven by 
perceived failure of political leadership.    
 Descriptive statistics of the five climate change belief statements measured 
on the ordinal scale are presented in Table 4, including percentages, mean scores 
and standard deviations. The first statement about severity of climate change 
recorded a mean score of 3.04. A significant number of respondents (39.6%) 
believed (i.e. ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’) that the problem has been 
exaggerated, more than those who contested this statement (i.e. ‘strongly disagree’ 
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and ‘somewhat disagree’) (37.0%). There is a sense of assurance among a significant 
minority of the general public. The comparable number who disagreed, however, 
suggests polarization in public opinions.  
Support for a conspiracy theory is deeply divided. The statement that the 
government has incentives to create fear yielded a relatively high mean score (2.87). 
Nearly half of respondents (48.1%) found such a conspiracy theory unconvincing, but 
37.8% held suspicions of the government. The level of distrust in scientists is modest, 
as indicated by the mean score of 2.54 for the third statement listed in Table 4. Most 
respondents (52.7%) indicated confidence in scientists who claim that climate 
change is anthropogenic, but one-fourth (26.4%) expressed serious doubts. The 
above three variables formed the basis of the composite item labelled ‘Fear and 
Trust’, which has a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.71. 
Polarisation is observed in the assessment of the relationship between 
human-induced climate change and natural disasters. About one-third (32.0%) of 
respondents believed that a causal relationship exists, but nearly half (49.3%) were 
unconvinced. Yet, respondents expressed little optimism in the stability of future 
climates. There was a general expectation among many (50.3%) that the intensity 
and frequency of natural disasters are increasing in Queensland. The composite item, 
‘Adverse Impacts’, created by combining these two variables, yielded an alpha value 
of 0.63.  
 
Relationship between assertion of property rights and climate change beliefs 
Statistical relationships between the variables discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 are 
presented in Tables 5 and 6. The three groups of climate change believers did not 
differ in belief about property rights and were therefore merged into one group (i.e. 
climate change is real). Results of a Chi-square test indicate that the merged group 
tended to be not supportive of the strong position on property rights (Table 5). On 
the other hand, climate sceptics were more likely to consider private property rights 
as irredeemable, regardless of compensation. Fewer sceptics than theoretically 
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expected would accept compensation as a condition for renouncing these rights. 
Strong rights-based belief is associated with denial of climate change. 
 The deontological position on property rights is also related to the two 
ordinal composite items of climate change beliefs. This is supported by the ANOVA 
results displayed in Table 6. Adherents of the deontological position tended to 
downplay the severity of climate change and expressed a lack of trust in authorities, 
as indicated by the significantly higher mean value of the ‘Fear and Trust’ variable. 
Furthermore, they were less likely to accept the science-based belief that climate 
change is a cause of more intense and frequent occurrence of natural disasters. This 
is reflected in the lower mean value of the ‘Adverse Impacts’ variable. Tables 5 and 6 
consistently demonstrate that climate sceptics are more likely to be deontological 
libertarians. 
 
Engaging the dissident? Scepticism linked to defensible rights  
Planning decisions aimed at climate adaptation are premised upon the scientific 
consensus that climate change is real. Objection to this consensus is seen as a failure 
to understand scientific evidence and a troubling problem to tackle (Hamilton, 2010; 
Washington and Cook, 2011). The prominent sociologist Anthony Giddens (2012) 
even called for renewed ‘assault’ on the arguments of climate sceptics. In a similar 
vein, Hayward (2008) considers organised libertarian protest against planned retreat 
to be an obstacle to climate adaptation and urges rethinking the merits of 
democratic processes in which local property owners succeeded in challenging a 
planned retreat policy. As Dryzek and Stevenson (2011) point out, some observers 
have lost patience with inclusive, polycentric climate change politics. 
Findings of the present research suggest that such libertarian protestors hold 
sceptical climate change beliefs. This may be particularly the case in Australia where 
there is a significant minority of climate-sceptical voters, much of the population 
reside in coastal settlements, and many are homeowners.  In community 
engagement processes dealing with the controversial issue of planned retreat, there 
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may be a tendency for the morality criteria of climate sceptics to be dismissed as 
irrational (Alexander et al., 2011). One example of these criteria is libertarian values, 
which underpin Hayward’s (2008) concerns. Acceptance of the reality of climate 
change leads us to view such morality criteria with suspicion. One may argue, 
however, that the conviction that the libertarian belief is problematic because it 
threatens to undermine adaptation efforts is itself contested.  
Attempts to de-legitimise sceptical climate change beliefs are likely to run 
into endless debates. Outright dismissal is possible on scientific grounds, but would 
not ease the tension if these beliefs are premised upon defensible cultural, 
ideological or ethical considerations. These beliefs may be driven by an intention to 
defend one’s fundamental rights, a strong sense of private sovereignty perceived to 
be threatened by disputed climate change decisions. The present study has 
demonstrated this attitudinal linkage, and is broadly consistent with other studies 
that show that climate change denial is culturally and socially organised (Hulme, 
2009; Norgaard, 2011). Although the failure to accept proven science is regrettable, 
the cultural reasons behind it may be legitimate. There is a moral need to include the 
sceptical individuals and seriously consider their deeper concerns, even though the 
scientific case for displacing scepticism appears to be compelling.  
 This moral need is even stronger to the extent to which we embrace the 
principle of value pluralism. In fact, value pluralism is precisely the main argument 
raised by some environmentalists to justify serious consideration of absolute rights-
based beliefs about the environment (e.g. Spash, 1997, 2006; O’Neill et al., 2008). By 
the same principle, climate scepticism driven by another form of rights-based belief 
cannot be easily stripped off - at least not in moral terms - without running into self-
contradiction. Multiple conceptions of climate justice exist and many can be couched 
in terms of rights. Some of them affirm continuing efforts to mitigate and adapt to 
climate change, whereas others call these efforts into doubt because of the costly 
compromises involved (e.g. the ‘rights to development’). Both of these rights 
arguments have been observed in the planned retreat debates. Cooper and 
McKenna (2008) present a case for the former, while the latter is evidenced by the 
present findings that asserted rights to property are linked to climate change denial. 
19 
 
The demonstrated linkage puts the pluralistic environmentalist into a dilemma: there 
is little moral ground for rejecting, a priori, a morally defensible conception of values 
that contests affirmative climate change beliefs, while accepting another that 
supports these beliefs. Otherwise the promise to respect different perspectives 
about climate change would become merely rhetorical. 
 The moral need for inclusion thus comes into conflict with the aim to tackle 
the climate change problem. Some public participatory processes prematurely 
downplay the disputed belief that climate change is not real or human induced. 
(Hobson and Niemeyer 2012, p. 409), for instance, promise an inclusive decision-
making process, but a stated aim of their designed deliberative forum was ‘to 
challenge climate scepticism’.  Few et al. (2007) lament that public participatory 
processes predisposed to a set of ‘required outcomes’, such as displacing scepticism, 
create an ‘illusion of inclusion’. They contend that it is untenable to circumvent 
reasonable opposition to the predefined objective of producing an anticipatory 
climate change adaptation strategy, while claiming to adhere to the principle of 
inclusion.  Involving the public in decision making processes for planned retreat is 
likely to fall into this participatory ‘trap’. Asserted absolute rights to private property 
(or land generally) can provide moral energy for rejecting or neglecting proven 
science when the alternative would be seen as compromising these rights. This 
reluctance to believe may be socially pathological and a problem to tackle, but the 
cultural or ethical motives behind it can be reasonable and eligible for inclusion. 
Given the correlation between these two, characterising climate scepticism as a 
troubling problem to tackle is at odds with the pledge to respect dissidents in 
participatory processes.  
 Nonetheless the present findings offer insights into an alternative route to 
accommodate climate scepticism. Sceptical individuals are likely to hold 
deontological libertarian values. Fidelity to absolute rights-based beliefs is a common 
ground on which these individuals and deontological environmentalists could 
communicate their competing perspectives. On the issue of planned retreat, a rights-
based framing could potentially reach both deontological sceptics and 
environmentalists, even though they might disagree with each other on whose rights 
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merit primary consideration. Common appeal to rights is not a source of consensus, 
but could make ‘meta-consensus’ (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006) possible, by which 
parties to dispute could see each other’s policy choices within an acceptable range. 
This situation is achievable in small-group deliberations. Lo et al. (2013) demonstrate 
this concept by presenting an example of a constructive dialogue, in which a 
rhetorical move appealing to trust brought sceptical deliberators and others to initial 
agreement, without completely displacing their competing climate change beliefs. 
The disagreeing individuals continued to dispute whom to trust, but they could come 
to an agreement on a policy framework deemed able to address their differing trust 
concerns. This process involved a creative search for generalisable principles, such as 
trust. Rights may be another example and warrant further exploration. 
 Climate scepticism is ideologically motivated (Hulme, 2009; Whitmarsh, 
2011). Exclusion of or any deliberate attempt to downplay scepticism might 
contradict the requirement of democratic inclusion to the extent that it is premised 
upon defensible moral considerations. Assaulting the dissident and dismissing their 
deeply entrenched beliefs impede social cooperation on climate adaptation. It is 
more appropriate to treat the source of disagreement as a cultural alternative and 
identify creative ways for recognising that what sceptics agree on is compatible with 
what we do. As far as climate adaptation is concerned, human and property rights 
can be articulated in terms that both parties could respect on ethical grounds. 
Although consensus is not guaranteed, communication can proceed more easily by 
making common ontological terrain explicit.  
 
Conclusions  
Planned relocation of human settlements as a response to accelerated sea level rises 
is informed by the science of climate change. Public concerns about renouncing 
property rights in the event of planned retreat have deontological elements linked to 
moral judgement on the evidence on climate change. Individuals hostile to such 
government intervention tend to disregard this evidence. Hostility increases with 
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climate scepticism. On the issue of planned retreat, people’s attitude toward 
property rights is associated with their climate change belief. 
Climate change communication can be construed as a cultural project. 
Homeowners’ reluctance to accept planned retreat policy and the climate change 
narratives that support it may be culturally or ideologically reinforced. Their 
concerns about climate change reflect their intention to retain control over their 
acquired rights. Not necessarily scientifically sound, the sceptical view however may 
be morally defensible. It is akin to the ‘rights to development’ cited by developing 
countries in the sense that assessment of climate change is subject to cultural 
acceptance and social organisation. This facet of the sceptical view resists 
rationalistic, science-based persuasion. 
 Appealing to absolute rights generally may be an effective way to approach 
the sceptical public on the issue of planned retreat. Rights offer a generalisable 
ontological framework in which they can see how their non-sceptical counterparts 
are similarly situated despite expressing a different policy preference. There may not 
be agreement about whose rights merit primary consideration, but rights-based 
arguments for climate change actions can more easily reach individuals who dispute 
the evidence on climate change.  
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Table 1 . Respondents by gender, age, education, and household income 
Socio-economic 
characteristics 
Category Respondent 
(%)  
Gender Male 44.3 
 Female 55.7 
Age 18 - 30 
31 - 45 
46 – 60 
Over 60 
3.2 
23.2 
35.9 
37.7 
Highest level of education 
completed 
No formal qualifications 
Year 10 or equivalent 
Year 12 or equivalent 
Trade / apprenticeship 
Certificate / diploma 
University degree 
Higher University degree 
7.8 
12.0 
18.0 
4.2 
17.2 
28.7 
12.2 
Total Annual Household 
Income 
Under AUD50,000 31.1 
AUD50,000 - 100,000 27.7 
AUD100,001 - 150,000 19.6 
AUD150,001 or more 12.2 
Refused to answer 9.4 
Household size (number of 
persons resident) 
1 18.0 
2 37.9 
3 17.4 
4 or more 26.8 
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Table 2.  Respondents’ asserted property rights 
Item Survey statement            N    % 
Rights irredeemable 
regardless of 
compensation 
Property rights are a fundamental 
right and cannot be renounced 
regardless of compensation 
65 13.0 
Rights redeemable 
with compensation 
Property rights can be renounced if 
adequately compensated by 
government 
250 49.9 
Rights redeemable 
without 
compensation 
Property rights can be renounced 
without compensation if owners 
have been informed of the risk 
before purchase 
161 32.1 
None of these 25 5.0 
Total 501 100 
 
Table 3. Respondents’ climate change beliefs on nominal scale 
Item Survey statement            N   % 
Scepticism Climate change is not real 67 13.4 
Defeatism Climate Change is real and it's out of 
our control 
178 35.5 
Technological 
Optimism 
Climate Change is real but new 
technology can fix it 
103 20.6 
Political Failure Climate Change is real and it’s a 
failure of political leadership 
97 19.4 
None of these 56 11.2 
Total 501 100 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for climate change beliefs on ordinal scale 
Item Survey statement Agree 
(%)* 
Neutral 
(%)# 
Disagree 
(%)^ 
Mean S.D. 
Fear and 
Trust  
We shouldn’t panic as the severity of 
climate change has been exaggerated 
39.6 23.6 37.0 3.04 1.42 
The federal government is just making 
money by creating fear of climate 
change 
37.8 14.2 48.1 2.87 1.54 
I don’t trust scientists who claim that 
climate change is caused by human 
activities 
26.4 21.0 52.7 2.54 1.42 
Adverse 
Impacts 
I believe that human-induced climate 
change contributed to the occurrence 
of natural disaster, such as the 2011 
Queensland floods 
32.0 18.8 49.3 2.65 1.44 
I expect that natural disasters in 
Queensland will become more serious 
and frequent in the coming decades 
50.3 25.5 24.2 2.54 1.42 
Note: * including ‘Strongly agree’ (5) and ‘Somewhat agree’ (4). # ‘Neither agree nor 
disagree’ (3). ^ including ‘Strongly disagree’ (2) and ‘Somewhat disagree’ (1). Row 
totals may exceed 100% due to rounding-up.  
 
 
 
 
  
28 
 
Table 5.   Asserted property rights by climate change beliefs on dichotomous 
scale 
 Count (expected count in parentheses) 
 Rights 
irredeemable 
regardless of 
compensation 
Rights 
redeemable with 
compensation 
Rights 
redeemable 
without 
compensation 
Total 
Climate Change 
is real 
50 (56.5) 224 (217.4) 140 (140.0) 414 
Climate Change 
is not real 
15 (8.5) 26 (32.6) 21 (21.0) 62 
Total 65 250 161 476 
 χ2 = 7.318, p < 0.05 
Notes: The null option ‘None of these’ is omitted from this table. 
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Table 6. ANOVA table for asserted property rights and climate change beliefs on 
ordinal scale 
  N Mean S.D. F 
Fear and 
Trust 
Rights irredeemable regardless of 
compensation 
65 9.55 3.708 7.690** 
Otherwise 436 8.28 3.417  
Adverse 
Impacts 
Rights irredeemable regardless of 
compensation  
65 5.23 2.350 9.216** 
Otherwise 436 6.17 2.329  
** denotes significance at the 1% level 
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